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Not My Brother's Keeper: The Inability
of an Informed Minority to Correct for
Imperfect Information
by
R. TED CRUZ* and JEFFREY J. I-INCK**
Introduction
In contract law, the defenders of the market champion freedom
of contract and the rights of parties to be bound and to bind others by
their consensual commitments. Critics of the market look instead to
notions of justice and fairness, as determined by the courts. In tort
law, market defenders advocate liability for fault, not merely for exist-
ence, and usually defend the right to contract for more or less tort
liability. The critics, in turn, see ignorance and exploitation, so they
urge risk distribution brought about by blanket liability imposed by
law, regardless of attempts to contract otherwise.
As is no doubt clear, we are in sympathy with the defenders of
the market; we have more faith in the autonomy and creativity of indi-
viduals than in the enlightened wisdom of the collective. Yet, in as-
sessing the arguments used by both sides, we have encountered a tool
of the defenders that is faulty. Because silence would be counter-pro-
ductive, this article instead exposes that weakness.
The market defenders' faulty tool is the informed minority argu-
ment. It arises both in contract and in tort law as a response to the
problem of imperfect information. In contract, there are often certain
terms that are latent, particularly in standard form contracts. These
typically fine-print terms are frequently not read by those that sign the
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contracts. And so, the argument goes, the demands of those consum-
ers-the discipline of the market-cannot constrain the terms. The
problem arises in tort law as well. In times of old, product manufac-
turers routinely included disclaimers of liability with their products.
These would be latent terms, arguably not read and hence not con-
sented to or compensated for by reduced demand. The critics of the
market have argued, and largely persuaded the courts, that, because
of imperfect information, neither standard form contracts nor liability
waivers should be enforced as written; instead, courts should imply
the terms that they believe would be better.
The defenders of the market have responded with a barrage of
arguments, minimizing the pervasiveness and the importance of im-
perfect information. Chief among those arguments has been the in-
formed minority argument. The defenders argue that if a sufficient
number of consumers read and understand latent terms and thereby
become informed, then they will demand efficient terms, and the pro-
ducers will in turn provide those terms to all consumers. While having
some intuitive appeal and, indeed, some theoretical validity, this argu-
ment carries little practical force. The assumptions underlying its gen-
eral application are largely wrong, and without those assumptions the
informed minority argument collapses.
This paper will explain why the informed minority argument can-
not in practice generally correct for imperfect information. Part I dis-
cusses the conditions of a perfect world, a purely efficient world
without market failures. Part II recounts the debate over imperfect
information, a debate that still rages. Part III.A addresses the in-
formed minority argument in particular. Part III.A.2 provides a for-
mal model of an informed minority to aid in explication and
understanding. Part III.A.3 assesses the conditions that would allow
the informed minority argument to prevail, Part III.B discusses other
possible sources of efficient terms, and Part IV reveals the gross weak-
nesses in the theory of the informed minority.
The informed minority argument is a poor tool for the defenders
of the market. If they are to prevail in the larger debate-and they
should-they must first realize that the informed minority argument
will not carry them to victory. Only then can they adapt and become
stronger.
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I. A Perfect World
A. Implications of a Perfect World Generally
In a perfect world, efficient markets are ubiquitous.'
Microeconomics provides the foundation and the underlying assump-
tions for imagining such a world. One of these fundamental assump-
tions is that both buyers and sellers are perfectly informed.2 When
buyers have perfect information about the quality and price of a prod-
uct, they will consume the optimal quantity of the good and it will be
priced competitively. In such a world, the market equilibrium will be
competitive in both price and quality; the efficient price and quality of
every aspect of the good will be found in the market.
If information is imperfect, however, the market will not be char-
acterized by complete efficiency. If consumers do not have perfect
information, then producers will have an incentive to supply too much
or too little of a particular product or product attribute.3 Consumers
may buy too much or too little of a product-foregoing buying prod-
ucts that make them better off and purchasing products that make
them worse off. Because our society is obviously imperfect, many
wonder why one should ever study a model of perfect competition.
The answer is threefold. First, knowing what happens if consumers
are perfectly informed is necessary to an understanding of what occurs
once this assumption is relaxed. Second, and perhaps more impor-
tantly, even though we live in an imperfect society, the assumptions of
a perfect market may be close enough to reality that this model may
more accurately describe the present state of affairs than any other
model.4 And third, even with imperfect information, the market may
1. "The better the society, the less law there will be. In heaven there will be no law,
and the lion will lie down with the lamb. The worse the society, the more law there will be.
In hell there will be nothing but law, and due process will be meticulously observed."
PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY 232 (1988). As in heaven, so too in a perfect world.
2. See Trade Regulation Rules, Labeling and Advertising of Home Insulation, 44 Fed.
Reg. 50218, 50222 (1979) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 460) ("It is a basic tenet of our
economic system that information in the hands of consumers facilitates rational purchase
decisions; and, moreover, is an absolute necessity for efficient functioning of the econ-
omy."); Howard Beales et al., The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information, 24 J.L. &
ECON. 491, 492 (1981) ("The importance of information to the operation of efficient mar-
kets is, by now, fairly well accepted."). Other assumptions include that consumers are
rational, utility maximizing, and able to order their preferences, and that producers are
numerous and profit maximizing.
3. ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMIcS 586-87 (1989).
4. "[A]bstraction is of the essence of scientific inquiry, and economics aspires to be
scientific. Newton's law of falling bodies, for example, is unrealistic in its basic assumption
that bodies fall in a vacuum, but it is still a useful theory because it predicts with reasonable
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better achieve the benefits of perfect competition-allocative and pro-
ductive efficiency, for example-than any other regime.
B. Implications of Information for Contract and Tort Law
If information is perfect, then contracts will be optimal; that is,
they will contain only efficient terms.5 This will occur because all of
the terms will, by definition, be fully understood and properly valued.
The efficient terms will be included because, "[i]f one seller offers
unattractive terms, a competing seller, wanting sales for himself, will
offer more attractive terms. The process will continue until the terms
are optimal."'6 Or, "[q]uite simply, rational individuals would not
enter into agreements unless they were better off after the
transaction."'7
This result will hold despite two factors that, among legal aca-
demics, are commonly thought to cause inefficient contract terms.
First, the result will obtain even if the seller is a monopolist,8 because
a perfectly informed consumer would accurately value all contract
terms, and a rational monopolist would simply extract monopoly prof-
its directly through price. Second, the presence of form contracts
would not be a problem. 9 This is because form contracts are not
merely devices to rip off unwary consumers; they also save on the
great transactions costs that would result if individualized bargaining
were always necessary.
Concomitantly, if information is perfect, contracts will contain
the optimal liability provisions for that particular market, i.e., for the
product, seller, and buyers in question. This result follows from what
is commonly referred to as the Coase theorem,10 that "[i]f there are
zero transactions costs, the efficient outcome will occur regardless of
accuracy the behavior of a wide variety of falling bodies in the real world." RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW 17 (4th ed. 1992).
5. See SHAVELL, PRINCIPLES OF THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 8.1 (draft copy).
6. POSNER, supra note 4, at 114.
7. Lee Goldman, My Way and the Highway: The Law and Economics of Choice of
Forum Clauses in Consumer Form Contracts, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 700, 714 (1992).
8. SHAVELL, supra note 5, at 14.2.11; POSNER, supra note 4, at 115.
9. POSNER, supra note 4, at 114 ("[T]here is an innocent explanation: The seller is
just trying to avoid the costs of negotiating and drafting a separate agreement with each
purchaser. These costs ... are likely to be very high .... Consistent with the innocent
explanation, large and sophisticated buyers.., often make purchases pursuant to printed
form contracts.").
10. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
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the choice of [background] legal rule."" The Coase theorem there-
fore predicts that contracting parties will choose the optimal liability
regime for themselves, which will depend in part on things like risk
aversion, optimal incentive structures, and ability to pay. Likewise, if
customers do not misperceive risks, the warranty that is sold will be
the one that results in the lowest true full price and therefore that is
socially best.12 Thus, those who believe information is nearly perfect
argue that liability disclaimers and all forms of warranty should be
allowed. 13
Unfortunately, if information is imperfect, one would also expect
to see form contracts, and there would be no obvious mechanism' 4
whereby one could be assured that no inefficient terms were included
in the contract.' 5 One would expect both a "quality effect" and a
"quantity effect."' 6 The quality effect would be the reduction in social
surplus because the consumers would purchase sub-optimal quality
goods. In other words, there is a transaction that would make the
combined parties better off but is not occurring. The less efficient
transaction occurs because the seller profits more by selling the infer-
ior good, which the buyers cannot properly identify as such. One
would also expect a "quantity effect" if the consumer mis-valued the
good and therefore consumed too much or too little of it. Where im-
perfect information prevails, the standard warranty terms may well be
undesirable, in which case the background form of liability will make
a difference because the parties will not necessarily contract to the
optimal liability regime.'7 One would expect, in such a scenario, that
11. A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW & ECONOMICS 12 (2d ed.
1989).
12. See SHAVELL, supra note 5, at 14.2.10.
13. See Session Three: Discussion of Paper by George L. Priest, 10 CARDOZO L. REV.
2329, 2339 (1989) (statement by Peter Huber) ("Any set of legal presumptions the courts
want to prescribe on silence is okay with me, provided one has a real law of disclaimability
to bring things back to a market optimum. Free contracting will then restore an optimal
state of affairs ....'").
14. See Beales et al., supra note 2, at 492 ("Without such information, the incentive to
compete on price and quality will be weakened, and consumer welfare will be reduced.").
15. This is not to say that no efficient terms would appear in the contract. One would
expect to see mainly seller-favoring terms, which are not necessarily inefficient. In other
words, the existence of seller-favoring terms hardly guarantees that the terms are ineffi-
cient or that imperfect information characterizes the market-other factors must be as-
sessed to make those determinations.
16. Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 5 (1980)
(effect of risk misperception); Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A
Theoretical Synthesis, 97 YALE LJ. 353, 376-78 (1988) (specifically addressing these effects
in the context of product safety).
17. SHAVELL, supra note 5, at 14.2.10.
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most form contracts would contain complete liability disclaimers, as-
suming they would be enforced. Indeed, research has shown that such
total disclaimers were quite common when they were widely
enforced.' 8
II. The Debate over Imperfect Information
Unfortunately, a perfect world is only a movie. Many market
failures have been discovered and countless more alleged. One of the
most prevalent sources of potential market failure is imperfect infor-
mation. As explained above, efficient market pricing depends on ac-
curate information; to the extent that parties are misinformed or
uninformed, they are less likely to be able to behave in accord with
their true preferences, and hence the market fails. The consequences
of imperfect information have been given great weight in the estab-
lishment of legal rules of contract and tort. And yet those very conse-
quences are hotly contested.
A. Voices of Concern About Imperfect Information
1. W. David Slawson
In an influential early article, David Slawson succinctly explained
the problem of imperfect information for consumers signing standard
form contracts:
[T]he overwhelming proportion of standard forms are not demo-
cratic because they are not, under any reasonable test, the agree-
ment of the consumer or business recipient to whom they are
delivered. Indeed, in the usual case, the consumer never even reads
the form, or reads it only after he has become bound by its terms.
Even the fastidious few who take the time to read the standard form
may be helpless to vary it ....
. Standard form contracts therefore] cannot reasonably be
regarded as the manifested consent of their recipient because an
issuer could not reasonably expect that a recipient would read and
understand them.19
A decade later, Slawson elaborated further on the problem:
Under typical circumstances, the terms [of standard form contracts]
d[o] not reflect what a reasonable person would conclude the con-
tracting parties had agreed to. It seem[s] clear that sellers [are] in-
tentionally designing their sales procedures so that a potential buyer
18. See Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution: The Revived
Case for Enterprise Liability, 91 MICH. L. REV. 683, 727 (1993).
19. W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmak-
ing Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 530, 544 (1975).
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would probably not read, let alone understand, their standard forms
prior to the sale.
Insurance policies [are] typically not seen by a purchaser until
he receive[s] them in the mail weeks after the purchase. Warranty
forms on consumer products [are] typically included along with the
product inside the box in which the product [is] packed, where the
purchaser w[ill] not ordinarily see them until he open[s] the package
at home.20
2. William Landes and Richard Posner
Two of the founding fathers of law and economics, William
Landes and Richard Posner, consider imperfect information to be the
answer to the "fundamental economic puzzle of products liability
law": Why contracts that waive product liability should not always be
enforced.2 ' They explain as follows:
[C]ontracts are costly to make and ... costs may well exceed the
benefits•., when the contingencies that would be regulated by con-
tract-death or personal injury from using a product- are ex-
tremely remote.... [When purchasing an expensive item like an
automobile] the greatest [contracting] cost [is] not the direct cost of
drafting [an express clause in the written purchase contract]; it [is]
the cost of information. The inclusion of such a clause would not
serve its intended purpose unless the consumer knew something
about the costs of alternative safety measures that the producer
might take and about the safety of competing products and brands.
But the cost of generating that information, and particularly the cost
to the consumer of absorbing it, may well be disproportionate to the
benefit of a negotiated (as distinct from imposed-by-law) level of
safety.
A manufacturer will reap little consumer ill will from fool-
ing consumers with a disclaimer that they fail to read, because prod-
uct accidents are so rare anyway; and for the same reason
competing manufacturers will not find it profitable to try to com-
pete by offering to disclaim disclaimers. High information costs rel-
ative to the benefits of the information may defeat voluntary
contracting.2
Landes and Posner do argue that if a manufacturer "take[s] steps
to make sure that the danger in his product is obvious to the con-
sumer[s]" then consumers will be "deemed to have assumed the risk
of an accident" and so "the manufacturer will not be liable. ' 23 Thus,
20. W. David Slawson, The New Meaning of Contract: The Transformation of Con-
tracts Law by Standard Forms, 46 U. Prrr. L. REv. 21, 38-39 (1984).
21. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RcIARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
TORT LAW 280 (1987).
22. Id. at 280-82.
23. Id. at 283.
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they consider imperfect information to be a significant barrier to effi-
cient bargaining only when warnings are not "obvious," that is, when
information costs are high.
3. W. Kip Viscusi
Likewise, Kip Viscusi considers "the chief inadequacy of the mar-
ket [to be] inadequate risk information." 24 He explains, "[t]he linch-
pin of the perfectly functioning market is that consumers and
producers be fully cognizant of the risks their choices entail. '25 Un-
fortunately, "information and transactions costs make complete inter-
nalization of the costs of risk impossible. '26 The resultant uncertainty
"complicates consumers' choices, [making] the possible difficulties
created by imperfect information for how individuals assess risks and
how they make choices ... substantial. 2
7
4. Todd Rakoff
Further commenting on the prevalence of consumer ignorance,
Todd Rakoff explains as follows:
[F]or most consumer transactions, the close reading and comparison
needed to make an intelligent choice among alternative forms
seems grossly arduous. Moreover, many of the terms concern risks
that in any individual transaction are unlikely to eventuate. It is
notoriously difficult for most people, who lack legal advice and
broad experience concerning the particular transaction type, to ap-
praise these sorts of contingencies. And the standard forms-be-
cause they are drafted to cover many such contingencies-are likely
to be long and complex, even if each term is plainly stated.... [I]t
is clear that the near-universal failure of adherents to read and un-
derstand the documents they sign cannot be dismissed as mere lazi-
ness. In the circumstances, the rational course is to focus on the few
terms that are generally well publicized and of immediate concern,
and to ignore the rest. The ideal adherent who would read, under-
stand, and compare several forms is unheard of in the legal litera-
ture and, I warrant, in life as well.28
24. W. Kip Viscusi, REFORMING PRODucTs LIABILITY 64 (1991).
25. W. Kip Viscusi, REGULATING CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY 2 (1984).
26. W. Kip Viscusi, Toward a Diminished Role for Tort Liability: Social Insurance,
Government Regulation, and Contemporary Risks to Health and Safety, 6 YALE J. ON REG.
65, 82 (1989).
27. Viscusi, supra note 25, at 4.
28. Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 1173, 1226 (1983) (footnote omitted).
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5. Steven Croley and Jon Hanson
In a recent article, Steven Croley and Jon Hanson have reiterated
the perils of imperfect information and its ubiquity:
[T]he efficiency of consumer product markets depends upon con-
sumers' ability to overcome information costs, for without full infor-
mation consumers are unable to make consumption and warranty
decisions that reflect their true preferences.... Because consumers
are not endowed with information about product risks, they must
acquire it, and any means of obtaining such information requires
investment. All else equal, the more information consumers seek,
the more costs they must incur.... Rational consumers will invest
only up to the point at which the marginal costs of additional infor-
mation equal the marginal benefits.
... Reading product warranties or product warnings, where
available, is one strategy consumers might adopt to obtain risk and
insurance information. But even that relatively inexpensive strategy
may not be worth its costs, especially where the probability of a
product accident is small.... Consumers must do more than read
the words in a warranty; they must know what the words mean and
whether the words are credible. Among other things, consumers
must know which liability standard applies in the relevant jurisdic-
tion and whether, how, and to what extent manufacturers can con-
tract around that standard through warnings or warranties.
Additionally,... the consumer must have some information about
the manufacturer's solvency or liability insurance coverage. In
short, the fact that the costs of reading a warranty or warning are
low does not necessarily mean that the costs of becoming well in-
formed also will be low.2 9
B. Rejoinders in Support of Informed Consumers
1. Patricia Danzon
In response to the bleak characterization of consumer informa-
tion presented by Landes and Posner, that, for example, no consumer
would "minutely inspect each soda bottle on the one-in-a-million
chance that it contains mouse parts,"30 Patricia Danzon countered as
follows:
[I]t is not so obvious that the costs of obtaining information so
clearly outweigh the benefits. For risks that are reasonably uniform
for all consumers ... the manufacturer or some consumer surrogate
such as Consumer Reports could presumably reduce to trivial levels
the costs of obtaining information about the probability of injury,
simply by publishing warnings. The issue is then the incentive to
read and assimilate such warnings. But this depends not only on the
probability of an injury for a single bottle of coke, but on the total
29. Croley & Hanson, supra note 18, at 770-71 (footnote omitted).
30. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 21, at 293.
March 1996]
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expected value of the information. Let us allow that the odds of an
explosion are one in a million, that the damages if an injury occurs
are (conservatively) $1 million, that the average coke consumer
drinks one bottle daily, and that technology changes each year, such
that information becomes obsolete after a year. With these parame-
ters, the value of information (ignoring discounting) is $365, which
is surely sufficient to outweigh the time costs required to read the
warning on a coke bottle once.31
Danzon therefore argues that "repeat purchase undermines the argu-
ment that it is not rational for consumers to process information about
low-probability events." 32 She then applies the same logic to con-
sumer durables, "which are frequently used although less frequently
purchased," and, a fortiori, to producer goods, purchased repeatedly
at high volume. 33
2. Richard Epstein
Similarly, Richard Epstein attacks the heavy emphasis Landes
and Posner give to information costs as "badly misguided. ' 34 He
questions the empirical basis for assuming a very low frequency and
severity of product liability claims (and hence low incentive for con-
sumers to become informed about warranties and liability disclaim-
ers), and he echoes Danzon's point about repeat buyers.35 Moreover,
he argues that the real battleground for tort liability is over products
with "very different characteristics" than coke bottles and shaving
brushes:
[W]ith respect to the major aviation, automotive, drug, and machine
tool cases, [the de minimis argument] is wholly misguided. The is-
sue of liability for personal injuries and consequential damages is
always on everyone's mind. In commercial contexts, the relevant
clauses are often carefully tailored and explicitly negotiated. 36
3. George Priest
In a highly influential article, George Priest argued that the em-
pirical data better support an investment theory of warranties than a
31. Patricia M. Danzon, Comments on Landes and Posner: A Positive Economic
Analysis of Products Liability, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 569, 571-72 (1985).
32. Id. at 572.
33. Id.
34. Richard A. Epstein, The Unintended Revolution in Product Liability Law, 10 CAR-
DOZO L. REV. 2193, 2204 (1989).
35. See id.
36. Id.
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theory of manufacturer exploitation of consumer ignorance. 37 Priest
defined his investment theory as follows:
A warranty is viewed as a contract that optimizes the productive
services of goods by allocating responsibility between a manufac-
turer and consumer for investments to prolong the useful life of a
product and to insure against product losses. According to the the-
ory, the terms of warranty contracts are determined solely by the
relative costs to the parties of these investments. 38
To make his case, Priest conducted an empirical examination of sixty-
two consumer product warranties. Looking at subordinate terms in
warranties (i.e., latent terms), he found a far greater correlation with
the relative costs of the consumer and manufacturer for particular
terms-the outcome predicted by his investment theory-than with a
shifting of all major costs to the consumer via the latent terms-the
outcome suggested by an exploitation theory coupled with consumer
ignorance of the terms' content. 39
4. Alan Schwartz
Further attacking the likelihood that imperfect information
causes significant market failures for consumers contracting out of tort
protection, Alan Schwartz asserts that "[p]roduct-defect risks are
among the most important risks that consumers face. Therefore, con-
sumers probably are familiar with the aspects of contracts that relate
to product failure. '40 Moreover, Schwartz differentiates between
forms of consumer misperception, distinguishing those that are poten-
tially harmful from those that are not. He argues that the problematic
form of consumer misperception is consumer optimism, "a consumer's
belief that product-related risks are less serious than they really
are."'41 Assessing the common assertion that consumer optimism is
the ordinary true state of the market, Schwartz responds as follows:
37. See George L. Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J.
1297, 1298-99 (1981).
38. Id. at 1298.
39. See id. at 1328-46.
40. Alan Schwartz, The Case Against Strict Liability, 60 FORDHAM L. REviEw 819,
826 (1992).
41. Schwartz, supra note 16, at 374. Schwartz models a more technical definition of
optimism as follows. He defines p* as the true probability of a defect and C* as the true
cost of a defect. He then defines the true expected value of the harm as R*, which equals
p*C*. Then, labeling the consumers' subjective estimates of these parameters as R, p, and
C, Schwartz defines a consumer as "optimistic" if R < R*. This could occur in three possi-
ble scenarios: (1) when p < p* and C < C*; or (2) when C > C* but p < p* "by enough to
dominate any overestimation of defect costs;" or (3) when p > p* but C < C* "by enough to
dominate any overestimation of loss probabilities." See id.
March 1996]
Whether consumers routinely underestimate risk levels is a complex
question because ... consumer errors in probability and cost assess-
ments can be uncorrelated, permit[ting] "cross effects." A cross ef-
fect occurs when the consumer makes offsetting mistakes in P [the
probability of a product defect] and C [the cost of a defect] ...
Because pessimistic mistakes-"everything happens to me"-could
dominate optimistic mistakes-"at least I'll never get seriously in-
jured"-it seems impossible to say a priori that optimism in risk
assessment is routine .... Whether consumers are systematically
optimistic thus seems to pose a factual, not a theoretical, question.42
Schwartz then reviews a number of empirical studies of consumer
attitudes towards risk and estimations of risk, and concludes that
"[t]he evidence fails to show that consumers misperceive risk levels to
the extent that undesirable equilibria exist."' 43 Moreover, "evidence
drawn from surveys and actual market behavior more strongly sup-
ports the view that consumers are informed than the view that they
are ignorant. ' '44
I1. Conditions for Efficient Terms Despite
Imperfect Information
A. The Informed Minority Argument
Simply stated, the informed minority argument is that if a suffi-
cient number of buyers are well-informed regarding the price and
quality of a product, then it will behoove the seller to sell the efficient
quality product at the competitive price to all buyers.45 This is be-
cause the seller's behavior is driven, to some extent, by the marginal
consumer. As the marginal consumer becomes several consumers, the
benefit to the seller of diverging from competitive conditions will be
outweighed by the cost to the seller of losing those consumers. Stated
differently, the cost of losing the marginal consumers will outweigh
the benefits of gouging the infra-marginal consumers. If the condi-
tions specified below are met, then the informed minority will success-
fully cure the problems caused by imperfect information-a
42. Id. at 375.
43. Id. at 379. But see Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits
of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 216 (1995) (reviewing several empirical studies and
concluding that the "evidence shows that as a systematic matter, people are unrealistically
optimistic").
44. Schwartz, supra note 16 at 380. Schwartz also alludes to the research findings of
George Priest, supra note 37, and observes that "[e]fficient contracts are unlikely to be
exacted by persons ignorant of contract content." Schwartz, supra note 40, at 826.
45. See Goldman, supra note 7, at 716.
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competitive equilibrium will obtain despite the presence of imperfect
information.
1. Prevalence of the Informed Minority Argument
The informed minority argument is made throughout the aca-
demic literature on contract and tort law.46 In many instances it is
used to defend the freedom of parties to contract, even when tradi-
tional indicia of contracting, bargaining and assent, are absent.47
Much of the criticism of the informed minority argument has taken
the form of decrying it as a chimerical device used by those who would
prefer to see us contracted into oblivion.48 Others have responded
46. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 43, at 243 (noting argument of Schwartz & Wilde);
Priest, supra note 37; Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis
of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630 (1979);
MJ. Trebilcock & D.N. Dewees, Judicial Control of Standard Form Contracts, in THE ECo-
NOMIC APPROACH TO LAW 93 (P. Burrows & C. Veljanovski eds., 1981); Charles J. Walsh
& Marc S. Klein, From Dog Food to Prescription Drug Advertising: Litigating False Scien-
tific Establishment Claims Under the Lanham Act, 22 SETON HALL L. REV. 389, 397-98
(1992) ("'Competition among manufacturers for the business of an informed minority is
often sufficient to provide benefits for all consumers."') (quoting Morton Schnabel, Con-
scious Parallelism and Advertising Themes: The Case for 'Comparative' Advertising, 7 AN-
TITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 11, 16 (1974-75)).
47. See, ag., Priest, supra note 37, at 1347 ("If a small group of consumers reads war-
ranties and selects among products according to warranty content, manufacturers may be
forced to draft warranties responsive to the group's preferences, even though the large
majority of consumers generally neglect warranty terms."); LANDES & POSNER, supra note
21, at 281 ("It is true that a market can operate efficiently even if some consumers are
poorly informed; they can take a free ride on the well informed .... "); Douglas G. Baird &
Robert Weisberg, Rules, Standards, and the Battle of the Forms: A Reassessment of §2 -2 07,
68 VA. L. REv. 1217, 1258 (1982); David B. Walrod, The Efficient Standardized Contract:
An Economic Analysis (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors) (1994).
48. See e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 43, at 240-44. More generally, the arguments take
two forms. First, many assert that consumers simply can never be informed. See id. at 244
("Most form takers will find it irrational to engage in search and deliberation on any given
form."); Michael I. Meyerson, The Efficient Consumer Form Contract: Law and Econom-
ics Meets the Real World, 24 GA. L. REv. 583, 601 (1990) ("This protection-by-proxy, how-
ever, is not applicable to subordinate contract terms. While adventurous consumers may
research to find the best price, the far greater costs of searching for ... different sets of
contract terms will overwhelm any benefit from doing so.").
Second, many argue that even informed consumers are helpless in the face of corpora-
tions. For example, Professor Rakoff argues:
Customers know well enough that they cannot alter any individual firm's stan-
dard document. They are largely members of the society that spawns business
firms, and they understand the institutional arrangements behind the take-it-or-
leave-it stance....
... i The internal rigidity of the firm will itself be likely to prevent a knowl-
edgeable adherent's objection to any form term from generating bargaining be-
havior, even if the objection is coupled with a threat to take his trade
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more dispassionately. 49 Because so many influential scholars rely on
the informed minority argument or, conversely, claim it can never ob-
tain, this article attempts to set forth the conditions under which the
argument can be pled successfully and the likelihood of those condi-
tions being met.
2. The Model
The model developed by Schwartz and Wilde with respect to pric-
ing under imperfect information 50 can be easily adapted to the case of
contract terms under imperfect information. 51
Interestingly, the proportion of comparison shoppers required to
ensure a competitive equilibrium on price is not at all the same as the
proportion of informed shoppers necessary to effectuate competitive
terms.52 This is so not because of some bizarre condition inherent to
form contract terms which prevents consumers from becoming in-
formed,53 but rather because the term varied is different. Instead of
elsewhere .... When contracts of adhesion become commonplace, even the
individual who reads and understands is, and may well perceive himself to be,
essentially helpless.
Rakoff, supra note 28, at 1225, 1228-29; see also Slawson, supra note 19, at 530-31. But see
POSNER, supra note 4, at 114 ("Where a transaction is between a large corporation and an
ordinary individual, it is tempting to invoke the analogy of duress and compare the individ-
ual to the helpless fellow forced to sign a promissory note with a knife at his throat ....
But there is an innocent explanation .... ).
49. See, e.g., Avery Katz, The Strategic Structure of Offer and Acceptance: Game The-
ory and the Law of Contract Formation, 89 MICH. L. REv. 215 (1990); Stiglitz, Imperfect
Information in the Product Market, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 769
(R. Schmalensee & R. Willig eds. 1989).
50. See Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 46, at 650-53.
51. In their article, Schwartz and Wilde briefly indicated the methodology for deter-
mining when such terms would be monopolistic or competitive. Id. at 659-62. However,
their assessment, which was not central to the rest of their argument, was in error.
Schwartz and Wilde claimed: "[A] monopolistic outcome for any term should be presumed
to occur if a substantial portion... of the comparison shoppers [equal to the proportion of
comparison shoppers necessary for a competitive market] are not term conscious." Id. at
661 (footnote omitted and emphasis added). For reasons not altogether clear, Schwartz
and Wilde thus claim that only a fraction of the comparison shoppers need to be term-
informed rather than a fraction of all shoppers. Therefore, in their model where one-third
of the shoppers had to be comparison shoppers for a competitive equilibrium, Schwartz
and Wilde would be claiming that, say, a mere one-ninth of all shoppers must be term
conscious to rebut the presumption of monopolistic terms. See TREBILCOCK & DEWEES,
supra note 46, at 105 (stating that under the Schwartz & Wilde model, conceivably only
10% of consumers must be informed with respect to the contract terms). This, however, is
incorrect, as we explain below.
52. This might have been all that Schwartz and Wilde were claiming in the passage
quoted in footnote 51. See Croley & Hanson, supra note 18, at 717.
53. See Meyerson, supra note 48, at 601.
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varying the price, holding quality and hence average marginal cost
constant, now one is holding price constant, and varying the quality
term (represented by the marginal cost term) of the equation.54 Thus,
until now, the literature has been improperly assuming that the
Schwartz and Wilde model carries over sans change. The proper
equation, irrespective of the number of comparison price shoppers, is:
P - C"'
1 >1 - (1)
P - (Cm - X)
where
N,
(2),
N1 + Nu
N, is the number of informed shoppers, Nu is the number of unin-
formed shoppers, P is the price determined in the market (based, per-
haps, on the Schwartz and Wilde equation),55 C,, is the average
marginal cost of producing the good in question, and X is the average
cost savings to the seller from including inefficient terms.5 6 There are
two major assumptions behind this simplified formula. The first is
that the average marginal cost of producing for the informed consum-
ers, or the last N, consumers, equals the average marginal cost of pro-
ducing for the uninformed consumers, or the first Nu consumers. The
second is that the uninformed consumers are completely uninformed;
that is, they do not merely under- or over-value terms but they place
no value on them whatsoever. Both assumptions are later relaxed.
54. Fixed costs are assumed not to change. This is a reasonable assumption as con-
tractual terms usually involve probabilistic elements of loss that do not necessitate a capital
investment, but rather require or excuse the manufacturer from paying cash to the con-
sumer at a later date. Such terms are best represented as changes in marginal cost, which is
essentially the actuarial value of these terms. A fixed cost parameter might change if one
envisioned something akin to a repair warranty which required an investment in repair
shops or equipment. In any event, although consideration of changing fixed costs is be-
yond the scope of this article, they likely would change little of our analysis because the
numerator on the right side of equation (1) would get smaller as inefficient terms were
included (e.g. no repair warranty) rather than the denominator getting larger when the
effect is on marginal cost. Of course, both have a similar effect (directionally) on the
equation.
55. For other models predicting price dispersion because of consumer misinformation,
see Tibor Scitovsky, Ignorance as a Source of Oligopoly Power, 40 AM. ECON. REv. 48
(1950); Steven Salop & Joseph Stiglitz, Bargains and Ripoffs: A Model of Monopolistically
Competitive Price Dispersion, 44 REv. ECON. STUD. 493 (1977).
56. For example, in the case of a liability disclaimer, this amount, absent transaction
costs, would be equal to the expected loss to the consumer, ie., the probability of harm to
the consumer multiplied by the expected harm to the consumer.
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The derivation is quite simple. The seller expects to gain the
amount X for each uninformed purchaser. Thus, the seller expects to
gain X * Nu by including inefficient terms. Similarly, the seller ex-
pects to lose an amount equal to P - C,, for each informed purchaser
who no longer buys his goods.57 Thus, the seller expects to lose (P -
C,,)N. In terms of total profit, the seller reaps Nu(P - (C,, - X)) by
having inefficient terms and (NI + Nu)(P - C,,) by having efficient
terms. Thus, the seller will include the efficient terms if and only if:
Nu(P - (Cm - X)) (NI + Nu)(P - C.) (3).
Rearranging, subtracting one from each side, and multiplying each
side by negative one gives
N, P - Cm
>1 - (4).
N, + Nu P - (C. - X)
Substituting I for the left side of the inequality yields
P - Cm
I 1 - P- (Cm 
- X)
Now, reviewing the Schwartz and Wilde hypothetical, it becomes
apparent why their formula does not explicitly address contract terms:
it has no term to demonstrate the change in cost due to a change in
contract terms. If one assumes, in addition to their other hypothetical
numbers, that the cost savings of all seller-favorable terms is $50, the
result using equation (1) is:
400 - 200 200
I>1 = 1- = 0.20
400 - 150 250
57. In a perfectly competitive industry, this will be equal to
Cf
N,
where Cf is the fixed cost and N, is the efficient scale quantity. Later, when the assumption
of constant marginal cost is relaxed, this will no longer hold over a distinct subset of con-
sumers, but will hold in the aggregate. In all markets, except a natural monopoly, one
would expect marginal costs to be rising and thus P - C,, will be less than
Cf
N,
for the marginal consumers and greater than
Cf
N,
for the infra-marginal consumers.
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In other words, using this hypothetical, 20% of shoppers would have
to be term-conscious, not 33% and not 11%. Of course, one can
change the cost savings to achieve virtually an unlimited set of possi-
ble values for . However, this figure should not be given talismanic
force.58 Like Schwartz and Wilde's number, the result of our hypo-
thetical is not empirical. Instead, rather than rely on empirical study,
we have conducted a sensitivity analysis to demonstrate the wide ar-
ray of possible results depending on the underlying market character-
istics. This is presented in Table 1 on page 654.
One can also envision a more dynamic equilibrium where the
price term can change to reflect an imperfect evaluation of terms
rather than simple ignorance of their existence. This requires us to
relax the assumption that uninformed consumers place no value on
terms. The formula that would capture imperfect valuation would
then be:
11 ___ P -(5),
FP-(Cm -X)
where P is the market price of the good before inclusion of inefficient
terms and P is the market price after inclusion of inefficient terms. If
people systematically undervalue the cost of inefficient terms, say a
disclaimer, then one would expect P - C,, < P- (C,, - X) because P' +
X would exceed P. Nevertheless, whenever consumers undervalue
the inefficient terms, the denominator of equation (5) is by definition
less than the denominator of equation (1), and so the number of in-
formed consumers necessary for a competitive term equilibrium to ob-
tain is less than if consumers place no value on inefficient terms at all.
It is also possible that there are terms for which consumers over-
value the benefits. For example, they may overvalue certain warran-
ties.59 In this case P - C,, < P' - (C,, - X) as well, but for a
58. One of the more disturbing features of the legal literature regarding imperfect
information is its insistence upon quoting Schwartz & Wilde's figure as if it had some par-
ticular relevance when it does not. See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 7, at 719 ("Commenta-
tors positing this basis for the presumption of an efficient market acknowledge that at least
one-third of consumers must be informed to protect the remaining consumers' interests.");
Croley & Hanson, supra note 18, at 717. Instead, Schwartz & Wilde merely used the 33%
figure as a possible result in the clothes dryer market. The numbers used to arrive at the
33%, however, had no empirical significance. More importantly, as observation of the
market sensitivity table elucidates, the result from one market certainly cannot be extrapo-
lated to all markets. Had Schwartz & Wilde used different hypothetical figures and come
up with results of 2% or 98% instead, no doubt those too would have been deemed by
some to be the necessary proportion in all markets.
59. See Schwartz, supra note 16, at 379 (noting that consumers "routinely purchase
extended warrantee coverage when buying expensive items").
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fundamentally different reason. In this case both P' and (C,, - X) are
greater than, rather than less than, P and C,, because the seller has
added a pro-buyer contractual term that costs him some positive
amount, making X, the cost savings, a negative number. Nevertheless,
P - (C,, - X) is greater than P - C,,, because buyers overvalue the
terms: P' increases more than (C,,, - X). This is the mirror image of
what occurs with undervalued terms, where (C,,, - X) decreases more
than P'. But, even for overvalued terms (as with undervalued terms),
unless a critical mass of consumers is aware of the terms' existence,
the efficient terms will not obtain.
The result for overvalued terms also explains, in part, why effi-
cient terms are not more common. Regardless of the amount of com-
petition, unless a significant number of consumers is well informed, it
will be costly for the manufacturer to provide efficient terms because
the consumers will not be willing to pay for efficient terms that they
do not know exist or that they improperly value. Thus, unless one of
the equilibrium equations holds, the only time the manufacturer
would be induced to include the efficient terms for the informed con-
sumers is if the ignorant consumers could be prevented from utilizing
the latent contract terms. This might be plausible given their igno-
rance of the terms ex ante, particularly if the manufacturer can some-
how differentiate the good.60 Regardless, the efficient terms would be
included at most only for the informed consumer, leaving the unin-
formed consumer unprotected.
We can also relax the assumption that the average marginal cost
is constant over the two groups. 61 Instead, marginal cost can be a
function of quantity, which will necessarily be different if the seller
decides to include only efficient terms. That is,
Cm = f(q) (6).
Then
Nu
f f(q)
q=O
is the total marginal cost for the uninformed consumers, and
N,
f f(q)
q=Nu
60. See infra Section IV.B.2.
61. This is especially fitting in cases where the number of informed consumers is very
small. For example, it is unlikely that the marginal cost is the same for the first 95% per-
cent of buyers as it is for the last 5%.
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is the total marginal cost for the informed consumers. The seller will
include the efficient terms if:
Nu Nu N,
Nu(P + AP + X) - f f(q) !- (NI + Nu)P- I f(q) - I f(q) (7)
q--O q=O q=Nu
where AP = P - P'. Multiplying out and simplifying this formula gives:
N,
Nu(AP + X) NIP - f f(q) (8)
q=Nu
Multiplying each side by
1
N,
and
(AP + X)
yields
Nu P - CluP-CM (9),
N, AP+X
where CIM is the average marginal cost for the informed consumers,
Le.,
N,
f f(q)
q=Nu
CIM =
N,
Flipping the terms on both sides of the inequality gives,
N, AP+ X
S>_ (10).Nu P - CIM
One can then substitute the results of the left side of inequality (10)
into equation (2),
N,
N1 + Nu
to find the proportion of informed consumers necessary to obtain an
equilibrium where all of the contracts contain the efficient terms. As-
suming increasing marginal costs, the proportion of consumers that
must be informed will be greater than they were under inequality (5),
which was less than under inequality (1). Thus, the effect of relaxing
the assumptions is indeterminate ex ante. The effect from undervalu-
ation as opposed to no valuation is to decrease the proportion that
March 1996] NOT MY BROTHER'S KEEPER
must be informed while the effect of increasing marginal costs is to
increase the proportion that must be informed. Given the difficulty of
measuring average marginal cost 62 and consumer undervaluation, one
may feel more comfortable relying on inequality (1) because these ef-
fects are offsetting.
Although the figures presented by inequality (10) are the most
accurate, it is easier, for expositional purposes, to rely on inequality
(1) to demonstrate the sensitivity of the informed minority argument
to the prevailing market conditions. 63 The range is as follows, with
market price and cost savings presented as percentages of marginal
cost so as to be applicable to any market.
Table 1 - Sensitivity to Price and Cost
X= X= X= X= X= X
.95C, .75Cm .5Cm .1Cm .05C,, OC..64
P = 1C",65  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1/I
P = 1.25Cm .79 .75 .67 .29 .17 I
P = 1.5C, .66 .60 .50 .17 .09 I
P = 2Cm .49 .43 .33 .09 .05 I
P = 5Cm .20 .16 .11 .02 .01 I
As demonstrated by the above table, the underlying price and
cost structure of the market in question makes an enormous differ-
ence in determining the proportion of shoppers that must be informed
before competitive terms will presumptively exist.66 Generally speak-
ing, one can assume that prices are fairly close to average marginal
62. Measuring average marginal cost over a defined subsection requires knowing the
marginal cost function of the firm; whereas, just measuring average marginal cost over all
sales only requires knowing the total marginal cost and quantity, which is simply the aver-
age variable cost.
63. "When the economic analyst seeks to make a very simple economic model more
complex ... he runs the risk of finding himself with too many degrees of freedom: that is,
with a model so rich that no empirical observation can refute it-which means that no
observation can support it, either." POSNER, supra note 4, at 17.
64. If X = 0, then the seller gains nothing by including an inefficient term, and hence
will never do so, which is represented by the letter I, for impossible.
65. If the market price is equal to the average marginal cost, which is less than the
competitive price if there are fixed costs, then all of the buyers would have to be informed
before it would no longer be profitable for the seller to insert such terms, i.e., even in the
short run the seller is indifferent between staying in the market or exiting.
66. Thus, blanket proclamations that "competition will not have this effect unless a
significant number of form takers participate in this search," are without merit. See Eisen-
berg, supra note 43, at 243. Whether a significant number is needed cannot be determined
without reference to the market.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 47
costs, say between 1.25 and 2.0, while the cost savings from inefficient
contract terms are likely to vary widely, depending on the term in
question. For terms such as forum selection clauses and inefficient
warranties, the cost savings is likely quite small, say around 1%. On
the other hand, disclaimers of liability could produce fairly large cost
savings, say 10%, and for some products the proportion of marginal
cost may be far greater.67 Thus, an entire "package" of inefficient
terms may, on average, result in a cost savings of 10% to the seller. If
these assumptions prove correct, then the proportion of consumers
that must be term-informed is somewhere between 10% and 30%,
both of which are relatively large given the impediments to formation
of an informed minority discussed below. 68 However, it is entirely
conceivable that there are markets in which less than 2% or more
than 80% of the shoppers would have to be informed in order for
contract terms to be competitive. 69
Because terms are separable, however, sellers can include any ar-
ray of terms so as to reap some reward from inefficient terms. If a
particular package of terms transfers enough value from consumers
for an informed minority to be effective, sellers can always remove
some terms from the package and decrease the incentive for buyers to
become informed.70 Although less remunerative terms require a far
smaller proportion of informed consumers, they also are less worth
the cost of becoming informed. If the consumer's cost of becoming
informed about each term is identical, then it will always be the case
that fewer consumers will desire to become informed about the more
inconsequential terms. If consumers as a group have some minimal
67. See, ag., HUBER, supra note 1, at 3 (asserting that liability costs, and therefore the
marginal cost savings of an enforceable disclaimer, are over 95% for children's vaccines,
33% for small airplanes, and 30% for stepladders).
68. Compare ARTHUR YOUNG & COMPANY, WARRANTIES RULES CONSUMER BASE-
LINE STUDY (1979) (study finding that from one-fourth to one-third of all consumers
purchasing goods read the warranty before purchase) (cited in Jeff Sovern, Toward a The-
ory of Warranties in Sales of New Homes: Housing the Implied Warranty Advocates, Law
and Economics Mavens, and Consumer Psychologists Under One Roof, 1993 Wis. L. REv.
13,71 n.228 (1993)) with ALAN SCHWARTZ & ROBERT E. SCOTT, COMMERCIAL TRANSAC-
TIONS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1142 (2d ed. 1991) (explaining how a bank required to
send pamphlets delineating the regulations on electronic fund transfers included a state-
ment in 100 randomly selected pamphlets that it would pay $10 to any customer who sent it
in and not a single one did so).
69. But see LANDES & POSNER, supra note 21, at 281 ("[I]t may well be that only a
trivial fraction of consumers have any feel for the very low risks associated with most prod-
ucts-too small a fraction to influence manufacturers' decisions on safety.").
70. Of course, the position of the buyers is complicated by the fact that they act sec-
ond in the sequential game with the seller. Buyers cannot value the latent terms before
they decide to invest the cost to become informed. See infra Section IV.A.1.
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cost of becoming informed that is positive,71 all terms that have an
expected cost to the consumer of less than this amount will be in-
cluded in the contract. Thus, even if one would not predict that every
term in a contract would be inefficient, one would predict that virtu-
ally all standard contracts would contain some inefficient terms, unless
there existed a sufficiently large group of consumers for whom the
cost of becoming informed was zero.
Even if the number of informed consumers necessary to demand
competitive terms is small, the ability of an informed minority to pro-
tect the uninformed majority still depends on the sellers being unable
to discriminate between the informed and uninformed buyers. 72 The
ability to identify and segregate consumers, however, becomes much
easier as the number of informed buyers becomes smaller. Under
such conditions, the seller needs only to target a small proportion of
his buyers to defeat the effect of an informed minority upon the terms
offered to uninformed consumers. If it is shown that a particular mar-
ket has characteristics so that only 5% of shoppers must be informed
before competitive terms would obtain, it would likely be relatively
easy for sellers to identify those 5%, or a portion of those 5%, and
offer them different terms, thereby rendering it beneficial from the
seller's perspective once again to include inefficient terms in equilib-
rium. Thus, as selling products with uniformly bad terms becomes
more difficult, segregating consumers into uninformed and informed
subsets becomes increasingly easier. When coupled with the ability to
separate inefficient terms, it becomes exceedingly difficult to under-
stand why so many people take comfort in the informed minority
argument.
Interestingly, the model also predicts, counter to the occasional
suggestions of others, 73 that as a market becomes less competitive in
terms of price, there is less chance that inefficient contract terms will
obtain.74 This is because the further the market price is from average
71. This assumption seems very likely to be true. See Eisenberg, supra note 43, at
240-43 (describing the costs incurred in assessing latent terms found in most form
contracts).
72. See infra Section IV.B.2.
73. "[I]t seems unlikely that markets that are competitive with respect to price will be
monopolistic with respect to terms .... " Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 46, at 661-62.
74. Some scholars (including, on occasion, Schwartz and Wilde) have recognized this
correlation, albeit indirectly, with respect to monopolies. See Alan Schwartz & Louis L.
Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties
and Security Interests, 69 VA. L.REv. 1387, 1402-20 (1983); Schwartz, supra note 16, at 373
("There seems little reason to believe that firms also exploit insufficient consumer shop-
ping by 'degrading' contract 'quality'-by not selling insurance at all."); Schwartz, supra
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marginal cost, i.e., the greater P - C,, becomes, the smaller the
number of informed consumers necessary to dissuade a seller from
including inefficient terms. Nevertheless, if the price is artificially high
because of imperfect information regarding prices (the Schwartz and
Wilde model), one might expect monopoly terms more often because
there are simply fewer informed consumers. Thus, the total effects of
relative price competition are in fact indeterminate; competition re-
quires more informed consumers to render inefficient terms unprofita-
ble, but it may also indicate that more informed consumers actually
exist in that market.
3. Conditions for Informed Consumers
a. Low Cost Information
The single most important determinant of the number of in-
formed consumers is the cost of information. If becoming informed is
relatively cheap, then one would expect that many consumers would
become informed. The empirical debate about the cost of information
is far from settled.75 However, it is clear at least that becoming in-
formed does have some positive cost.7 6 Some have argued that once
one becomes informed as to the general nature of contractual terms,
the marginal cost of becoming informed with respect to any particular
seller's terms is close to zero;77 that is, that the greatest single cost is
learning what is meant by the legalese accompanying most products,78
and once this is done the marginal cost of becoming informed with
respect to any particular product is quite 1ow.79
note 40, at 826-27 (stating that "when firms have market power because of insufficient
consumer search, firms seldom will offer consumers worse contracts than the consumers
prefer, and seem unlikely to degrade the quality of important product attributes"); Priest,
supra note 37, at 1321 ("A principal weakness of the exploitation theory is that it provides
no theoretical link between market power and product warranty terms."); POSNER, supra
note 4, at 115 ("[S]ince a monopolized product will be priced higher than it would be under
competition, prospective buyers will invest more, rather than less, in search .... ").
75. For those believing the cost of becoming informed is prohibitive, see, e.g., Eisen-
berg, supra note 43, at 240-43; Goldman. supra note 7, at 717; Meyerson, supra note 48, at
596-608. For those believing the cost of becoming informed is insignificant, see, e.g.,
Danzon, supra note 31, at 571-73; Schwartz, supra note 40, at 828 ("No specific studies
establish that consumers have or lack sufficient information to make optimal decisions
respecting product risks.").
76. See Beales, et al., supra note 2, at 500 ("Information is costly, and perfect informa-
tion is neither feasible nor desirable."); LANDES & POSNER, supra note 21, at 280-83.
77. See Walrod, supra note 47, at 33.
78. See Eisenberg, supra note 43, at 240-42 (discussing problems raised by form
contracts).
79. See Walrod, supra note 47, at 33.
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Although it is undoubtedly true that the cost of learning the
meaning of various terms in general is greater than the cost of reading
any single seller's contract, this observation only goes so far. First, not
only must one determine what the provisions mean, but one must also
assess their impact on a case-by-case basis. Not every forum selection
clause will have the same impact; a forum selection clause with Texas
or New York as the forum will mean very different things if the prod-
uct is likely to break but not to cause injury than if the reverse is true.
Second, there is always the actual cost of reading the innumerable dis-
claimers, warnings, and warranty conditions that typically accompany
each product. Although not usually large in absolute terms, this cost
is frequently non-trivial relative to the cost of the product and, more
importantly, to the expected loss from inefficient terms. For example,
a simple device like a thermometer can have a multi-page booklet on
safety instructions and warnings, despite a relatively minuscule ex-
pected harm.80 Thus, for many products, any cost whatsoever may be
enough to induce consumers not to become informed.
b. Advertising
If it is relatively cheap for sellers to supply the information, sell-
ers may do so because the buyers would be willing to pay for the effi-
cient terms to be put in the contract if they knew about them.8' That
is, the sellers will supply the information if the cost of their doing so
plus the money they will lose from no longer having inefficient terms
is less than the amount they would gain from including the efficient
terms. Formally, this is represented as:
Ca + Nu(P - (Cm - X)) _ (NI + Nu)((P + P) - Cm) (11)
or
80. Cf Danzon, supra note 31, at 572. Professor Danzon makes the point that even if
the expected harm is slight for one use, for goods which the consumer buys or uses often,
the expected harm is much greater, and thus consumers may be induced to become in-
formed after all. Id. Although Professor Danzon's argument is correct insofar as it sug-
gests that one ought to look at the total expected harm from remaining uninformed with
respect to a particular product over time, her analysis does not necessarily prove that such
consumers would always become informed. First, if the consumer does not know the harm
ex ante, then it is of no moment that the expected harm is great. Second, as Croley &
Hanson point out, this argument "assumes that manufacturers cannot alter their warran-
ties." Croley & Hanson, supra note 18, at 774.
81. See Sanford J. Grossman, The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Dis-
closure About Product Quality, 24 J. L. & EcoN. 461, 479 (1981) (discussing disclosure
costs); Stephen J. Ware, A Critique of the Reasonable Expectations Doctrine, 56 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1461, 1480 (1989) (discussing the allocation of disclosure costs). Sellers may also find
it advantageous to make individualized offers. See infra Section IV.A.1.
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Ca + NuX - (N + Nu)P, + N,(P - Cm) (12),
where P, is the extra price paid for having the "competitive" terms put
in the contract, and Ca is the cost of advertising. If inequality (12)
holds, each seller has an incentive to advertise and include efficient
terms because he will increase his profits by doing so.82
However, this argument is fraught with problems as well. First,
unless the seller is a monopolist, there is a very real concern of free
riding.83 If one firm spends resources informing consumers about the
value of certain terms in its contract, it may well be unable to recoup
the costs of providing that information.84 As long as the products are
homogenous, the non-advertising sellers will benefit equally with the
advertising sellers, and thus no seller will have the proper incentive ex
ante to provide the information. In other words, the first seller will
have the burden of informing all consumers of the efficient contract
terms, only to have the other sellers compete on price based on those
same terms, robbing him of the ability to recoup the sunk cost of in-
forming the consumers in the first place. That is, P, will equal the
marginal cost of providing the terms, but will not include
Ca
(N, + Nu)
because the other producers will not have incurred Ca. Of course, the
seller could attempt to differentiate his otherwise homogenous prod-
uct through advertising latent contractual terms, but this is a relatively
rare phenomenon.8 5
82. Duncan Kennedy suggests that sellers might also be motivated by honesty to do
this if it were not for the fact that they could not recoup a fair return for providing the
efficient terms in addition to the cost of advertising the terms. See Duncan Kennedy, Dis-
tributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Com-
pulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563, 599-604 (1982). This
analysis suffers in two respects. First, there is no reason to assume that sellers are altruistic,
and to do so is at odds with his premise that they will then not provide information with
respect to efficient terms because of the cost. Second, if it is really true that the sellers
cannot achieve an adequate return from providing the information, then it is not efficient
to provide the information, and it may also be inefficient to provide the term. For exam-
ple, if the term in question is a service warranty that nobody knows about, then it cannot
be efficient to include it because nobody will use it.
83. See Goldman, supra note 7, at 719.
84. Id.; see also George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty
and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. OF ECON. 488 (1970). But see Beales et al., supra note
2, at 504 (explaining ways that sellers can attempt to eliminate free-rider problems).
85. See Meyerson, supra note 48, at 601-02.
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Second, there are very few items for which it would be worth ad-
vertising contractual terms at all.86 Most contract terms likely provide
less benefit to consumers than the cost of providing them plus the cost
of advertising them. To be sure, automobile warranties are commonly
cited as an example against this hypothesis,87 but they represent a rel-
atively unique and possibly inapposite example. One might expect ad-
vertising for automobile warranties because the underlying product is
so expensive that the warranties are themselves quite valuable. Nev-
ertheless, if the only products for which contractual terms are adver-
tised are worth thousands of dollars, then there is a far larger segment
of the market for which no advertising will occur, i.e., automobile war-
ranties are the exception, not the rule.88 In fact, the majority of con-
tractual terms are simply never advertised.89
In sum, it is quite likely that C, is usually fairly large relative to Pc
and that P, will cover only the cost of the terms themselves and fairly
little of the sunk advertising cost, C,. Therefore, one would rarely ex-
pect advertising to correct for imperfect information.
c. Disclosure Laws
Likewise, it is often argued that disclosure laws can remedy im-
perfect information by making information less costly.9° Indeed,
86. See Goldman, supra note 7, at 718 ("Competitor advertising cannot be relied upon
to provide the information necessary to cure these market dysfunctions."); E. PATRICK
McGuIRE, INDUSTRIAL PRODUCT WARRANTIES: POLICIES AND PRACTICES 10 (1980)
(conducting study of warranty practices of 369 manufacturers and finding that 57% did not
advertise warranty terms). But see Ware, supra note 81, at 1480 (arguing that competitors
may inform consumers of comparative contract terms).
87. See, e.g., Walrod, supra note 47, at 31.
88. Another example sometimes given, that of lifetime tool warranties, at first glance,
appears to refute this hypothesis. However, because the relative replacement rate of tools
is virtually zero, it cannot be the case that these warranties are actually efficient contract
terms. Instead, they likely represent a signaling device regarding the quality of the tools.
That is, in some markets sellers send buyers signals to convey information about their
product's quality. See Gerner & Bryant, Appliance Warranties as a Market Signal?, 15 J.
CONSUMER AFF. 75, 85-86 (studying 158 warranties and concluding that signaling theory
explains most of the warranty terms encountered); Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling,
Q. J. ECON. 355 (1974). But see Priest, supra note 37, at 1303-07 (arguing that signaling
theory is inferior to investment theory as a predictor of warranty terms); Schwartz &
Wilde, supra note 74, at 1397-98 (contending that the frequency of warranties in commer-
cial contracts provides cogent evidence against the signaling theory).
89. See Meyerson, supra note 48, at 602 ("It is ludicrous to imagine a bank advertis-
ing, 'We have the only loan contract in town that doesn't require you to pay our attorney's
fees if we successfully sue you for default'...."). Of course, it probably would not be so
ludicrous if these terms were highly valued by consumers.
90. See, e.g., LANDES & POSNER, supra note 21, at 283-84 ("Therefore if the manufac-
turer wants to disclaim liability, he need only take steps to make sure that the danger in his
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many laws have been enacted along these lines.91 Essentially, the ar-
gument is that if some government agency or the liability regime itself
requires sellers to disclose certain terms and their effect, then the costs
of obtaining this information will decrease and contract terms will
therefore be efficient.92 The first part of the argument is true beyond
peradventure: disclosure laws will definitely decrease the cost to con-
sumers of becoming informed.93 However, far from obvious is
whether the decrease in cost is sufficient to induce consumers to be-
come informed;94 that is, whether the expected cost of reading the
warnings is still greater than the expected loss from inefficient terms.95
Nor is it clear that disclosures will motivate the critical mass of people
necessary to create an efficient term equilibrium.
A particularly salient problem with the disclosure argument is
that people will generally not know ex ante whether the costs of ineffi-
cient terms are large enough to make reading and understanding all of
the disclosed terms profitable.96 The best that they probably can do is
to broadly categorize products and assume that a particular one has
the average costs of inefficient terms for that product line.97 More-
product is obvious to the consumer. The danger may be obvious from casual inspection
but if not it usually can be made obvious by a warning on the label or by descriptive
literature included in the package in which the product is sold. In effect, the law enforces
an implicit disclaimer when the costs of information to the consumer are low, as is implied
by calling the danger 'obvious.' This solution is consistent with the economics of the prob-
lem."); Schwartz, supra note 40, at 840 ("The foregoing discussion shows that the most
normatively defensible legal regime for products is free contract with regulated disclo-
sure."); W. Kip Viscusi, REFORMING PRODUCTS LIABILITY 128 (1991); HUBER, supra note
1, at 213-15 ("The law of warning is the law of contract.").
91. See, eg., Fair Packaging and Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1451-61 (1976); Truth-in-
Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-65a (1976); Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosures Act, 15
U.S.C. 22 1701-20 (1976).
92. See SUSAN ROsE-ACKERMAN, RETHINKING THE PROGRESSIVE AGENDA (1992);
STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, DOING AWAY WITH PERSONAL INJURY LAW (1989).
93. Nevertheless, it will not necessarily decrease the absolute costs of becoming in-
formed when one adds the direct or indirect tax on such goods necessary to inform the
consumers. See, eg., Ian Ayers & F. Clayton Miller, "I'll Sell It to You at Cost". Legal
Methods to Promote Retail Markup Disclosure, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 1047, 1076 (1990).
94. See infra Section IV.A.1.; Croley & Hanson, supra note 18, at 737-67; Sovern,
supra note 68, at 71 ("[E]xperience suggests that consumers might respond to the receipt of
more detailed warranty disclosures by not bothering to read the warranty.").
95. See POSNER, supra note 4, at 181 ("[P]roduct failures that cause serious personal
injuries are extremely rare, and the cost to the consumer of becoming informed about
them is apt to exceed the expected benefit.").
96. See Croley & Hanson, supra note 18, at 741.
97. See STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 54-55 (1987) ("A
customer's assessment of the risk of a particular product or service will be based on his
estimate of the average risk for the class of products or services that have the same out-
ward appearance as the one in question.").
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over, the consumer will not even necessarily know what the inefficient
terms would look like. 98 Thus, while it may be true that an average
consumer would consider prescription drugs to have higher expected
costs than cosmetics, it is still not clear that he could correctly differ-
entiate one medicine from another or even understand the terms for
which he should be looking.
In short, while it is definitely true that advertising and disclosure
laws could facilitate an informed minority in its quest to overcome
imperfect information, it is unlikely that either of these devices will
actually result in widespread efficient terms. It is also unlikely that
disclosure laws, especially administered by juries or bureaucrats,
would ever be worth the nickel. 99 Indeed, there is evidence that these
bodies would only exacerbate the problem.t00
B. Other Conditions Under Which Efficient Terms May Occur
Even if the informed minority argument fails, there may be other
arguments that will save the case for efficient terms in standardized
contracts. Typically, two arguments are made: that people possess
generalized knowledge of product terms which prevents inefficient
terms even in the absence of a sizable contingent of perfectly in-
formed consumers, 10 1 and that a seller's reputational concerns will in-
duce him to include only efficient terms.
The first argument faces several obstacles. To see why, assume
that it is true that products will be assessed at the average rate of
quality prevailing in the market and that this assessment is perfect.
Sellers would then face a common moral hazard problem: each seller
would have an incentive to decrease the quality of its contractual
98. While it is possible that consumers can determine an average value of a personal
injury disclaimer term for a broad group of products, it is doubtful they can assess the
average value of a merchantability disclaimer, an arbitration clause, etc. More impor-
tantly, however, the consumer usually will not be able to determine the value of each term,
including the personal injury disclaimer, for that particular product. This in turn will still
lead to the Akerlof "lemons equilibrium" where top-flight products are seldom produced.
See Sovem, supra note 68, at 53-63; Akerlof, supra note 84.
99. See Ayers & Miller, supra note 93, at 1076 ("Requiring... disclosure when the
costs of communicating are higher than the value of the information to consumers would
force retailers to provide a service whose value is less than its cost.").
100. See Sovern, supra note 68, at 71-72 (discussing the potential for "information
overload").
101. This argument is sometimes cast in an "average information" context, which con-
tends that people know the impact of the terms on average. Although somewhat different
than the generalized knowledge argument, the two share a common feature: they both
claim that something short of particularized information is all that is needed for the effi-
cient market hypothesis to hold.
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terms because it would not bear the full decrease in the price that
consumers are willing to pay for its products. An equilibrium will be
reached only at the lowest quality possible before buyers will substi-
tute for other goods altogether.10 2 Thus, even given perfect genera-
lized knowledge, one would still expect to find inefficient terms.
The second argument, reputation, has more validity, but is only
likely to hold when either the informed minority argument itself holds
or when differentiation is already occurring and thus efficient terms
are not an equilibrium but only part of a term dispersion. First, and
most importantly, the probability of any single customer being af-
fected by any given contract term is usually quite small. 0 3 Many inef-
ficient terms involve liability disclaimers, accelerated payments,
repossession, forum selection clauses, or arbitration agreements, none
of which are likely to be invoked against a particular consumer or
even his acquaintances. In other words, consumers do not often get
"burnt," and thus a manufacturer will not lose much repeat or referral
business the few times it does occur.'04
Second, most people probably do not view the manufacturers' ac-
tions in these few cases as reprehensible even if they are inefficient.
When people do not pay their bills, it is doubtful their neighbors decry
the repo man's actions. Likewise, a manufacturer that is unwilling to
pay for injuries caused by its products is the norm, not the exception.
On the other hand, one can think of parties for whom reputation
would play a very significant role. One example would be sellers to
large, repeat consumers, such as major commercial buyers. With such
buyers, however, it is not at all difficult for sellers to differentiate be-
tween them and the uninformed consumers, particularly because sell-
ers can just individually negotiate contracts with them and supply
efficient terms from the outset.' 05 And, if all of the purchasers in a
given market are large commercial entities, then the informed minor-
ity argument likely would have force because it would be in the buy-
ers' interests to be informed. Likewise, reputation is also probably
important in the luxury goods market, but this is a differentiated mar-
ket by definition.
102. See Akerlof, supra note 84; Croley & Hanson, supra note 18, at 776-78.
103. See POSNER, supra note 4, at 181.
104. Nevertheless, it is still worth it for the manufacturer to include the term because
the few times it is invoked, the value to the manufacturer is very high.
105. See infra Section IV.B.2.
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IV. The General Failure of the Informed Minority Argument
Despite the great reliance upon it by the defenders of the market,
and despite its theoretical plausibility detailed above, in the final anal-
ysis, the informed minority argument has serious failings. While it
may hold in a few isolated cases, as a general matter it does not accu-
rately describe what usually occurs in the market. This is so for two
simple reasons. First, the existence of any sizable informed minority is
highly doubtful. And second, even if such a minority did exist, it
would only rarely solve the problem of imperfect information. Both
reasons are elaborated upon below.
A. The Unlikely Existence of a Sizable Informed Minority
1. Game Theory
Avery Katz has presented a compelling argument that it is irra-
tional for buyers to invest the cost into reading terms, so they cannot
be expected to do so. 106 Katz created a game theoretic contracting
model with two parties, a buyer and a seller, and two contracting
terms, price P (patent) and quality X (latent).10 7 Before the sale, the
seller makes a single offer to the buyer. The seller may first endeavor
to make quality (representing all latent terms) costlessly accessible to
the buyer, either by taking the time and effort to bring each of the
terms to the buyer's attention or by offering to reimburse the buyer
for all expenses incurred in evaluating the offer. The amount that the
seller incurs to make quality evident to the buyer, which Katz denotes
as S, is spent regardless of whether the buyer accepts the offer. Read-
ing the contract (including researching terms and possibly consulting
an attorney) exacts a cost R from the buyer. If the buyer does not
read, he decides whether to accept the offer based upon price and his
expectation about the quality of the product.
The seller's production cost (C(X)) and the buyer's reservation
price (V(X)) are both directly related to quality; the seller, however,
would like quality to be as low as possible and the buyer would like it
to be as high as possible. The buyer's reservation price if he does not
read the standard form contract is dependent upon his expectation of
the likely quality of the product, and is denoted E[V(X)]. Both the
buyer and the seller are subject to diminishing marginal returns, so
that greater investments in quality cost the seller more and more and
are valued by the buyer less and less. Therefore, the efficient level of
106. See Katz, supra note 49, at 272-93.
107. Id. at 282-90. The following discussion draws heavily from these pages.
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quality (X*) is where [V(X) - C(X)] is the greatest, thus maximizing
the gross surplus from exchange. The valuation (V*) and cost (C*) at
the efficient level of quality are such that the amount the buyer would
be willing to pay for an incremental increase in quality is precisely
equal to the amount that that increase would cost the seller.
Six scenarios are now possible. (1) The seller can make an indi-
vidual offer, and the buyer can accept. Here, the seller's payoff is [P -
C(X) - S], and the buyer's payoff is [V(X) - P]. (2) The seller can
make an individual offer, and the buyer can reject the offer. Here, the
seller's payoff is -S, and the buyer's payoff is 0. (3) The seller can
make a standard form offer, the buyer can decide not to read, and the
buyer can accept. Here, the seller's payoff is [P - C(X)], and the
buyer's payoff is {E[V(X)] - P}. (4) The seller can make a standard
form offer, the buyer can decide not to read, and the buyer can reject
the offer. Here, both the seller's and the buyer's payoff is 0. (5) The
seller can make a standard form offer, the buyer can decide to read,
and the buyer can accept. Here, the seller's payoff is [P - C(X)], and
the buyer's payoff is [V(X) - P - R]. And, finally, (6) the seller can
make a standard form offer, the buyer can decide to read, and the
buyer can reject the offer. Here, the seller's payoff is 0, and the
buyer's payoff is -R.
Katz's analysis then turns to predicting the likely behavior of the
parties under these payoffs. If the seller makes an individual offer, he
will provide the efficient level of quality (X*). This is because the cost
of the individual offer (S) is a sunk cost, and so the seller simply wants
to maximize the surplus from trade. Because the seller in this model
makes a single take-it-or-leave-it offer, he captures the entire surplus,
charging V* and earning a payoff of (V* - C* - S).
If the seller makes a standard form offer, Katz predicts that the
buyer will chose not to read and the seller will provide the lowest
possible quality level. For this proposition, he offers proof by contra-
diction. Assume arguendo that some buyers choose to read. For any
given price, an informed buyer has a reservation quality level (X(P))
such that he would be unwilling to accept any quality below that price.
The maximizing seller would never provide more than X(P); if he did,
he could reduce quality (saving production costs) without losing any
sales. The buyer's payoff then is [V(P) - P - R]. But, since at the
reservation quality X(P), V(P) is precisely equal to P, [V(P) - P] = 0,
and so the buyer's payoff reduces to -R. Therefore, Katz explains, a
condition in which buyers read cannot be an equilibrium.
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Thus, buyers will not read. If buyers do not read, then sellers will
provide the absolute lowest quality possible (constrained only by tech-
nological limits or by the minimum that judicial intervention will allow
uninformed buyers to purchase) because there is no way for buyers to
know the quality, and a reduction in quality simply decreases the
seller's cost without affecting the buyers' perceptions. Katz denotes
this quality level XO, and the corresponding seller's cost and buyers'
valuation as CO and VO. VO, he concludes, is the price that we can
expect sellers to offer products for with standard form contracts.
Katz also predicts when sellers will make individual offers and
when they will make standard form offers. With a standard form con-
tract, the seller stands to make at most (VO - CO); with an individual
offer, the seller could earn at most (V* - C* - S). Therefore, a seller
will make an individual offer only when the following condition holds:
[(V* - C*) - (VO - CO)] > S (13).
In structuring his model, Katz makes two important assumptions.
First, he assumes that reputation is not a factor.108 Second, he as-
sumes that all buyers value quality identically. 0 9 What yields the out-
come that Katz reaches is the particular sequential structure of the
bargaining. Buyers cannot discover the benefits of reading until after
they have already spent the resources doing so. Buyers are therefore
vulnerable to losing that sunk cost,110 and so reading is not an equilib-
rium strategy.
Thus, when viewed strategically (with the above assumptions), it
is irrational for buyers to read contracts to discover the latent
108. For the potential importance of this factor, see supra Section III.B.
109. Katz contends that his argument stands even when one relaxes this assumption.
See Katz, supra note 49, at 289-90. The reason is that, within any group of heterogeneous
buyers, there is one that is the most discriminating. Id. at 289. Sellers will set their quality
no higher than the reservation level of that buyer, and that buyer will no longer find it
profitable to read the offer (because his payoff is -R, as in the discussion above). Id.
Therefore, that buyer will stop reading, and the next highest buyer will become the most
discriminating buyer. Id. at 289-99. Sellers then will lower their quality to that buyer's
reservation level, and then to that of the next, and the unraveling will continue until no
buyer is left reading. Id. The only situation in which this unraveling would not occur is if
there is a group of buyers for whom the cost of becoming informed is trivial. Id. at 290.
Katz, however, does not consider it likely that such a group, if it were to exist at all, would
be very large.
110. This point is not as powerful if information gained from reading one contract can
be applied to later contract, i.e., if learning about default liability rules or forum selection
clauses today makes reading about those clauses tomorrow far less costly. But see text
accompanying notes 77-80, supra.
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terms."' They cannot threaten sellers that they will do so, because
any such threat would not be credible. Sellers will therefore behave as
if buyers are not going to read and will make the latent terms those
minimally acceptable to the buyers. Buyers, anticipating this, will only
be willing to pay the amount that they value the product with those
minimum contractual terms. If the seller has more to gain from offer-
ing better terms, the seller will make an individual offer so that the
terms are costlessly available to the buyer, and the buyer can then
choose to pay a higher price to the degree that he values those terms.
Katz's argument is quite persuasive. It does, however, have some
weaknesses. His analysis assumes (as do most game theory and, in-
deed, economic arguments in general) a very high level of rationality
and forethought from the parties. This high level of rationality is
somewhat belied by our everyday experiences that suggest that people
do not always think through their own actions. Even more rarely do
people take the analysis through multiple iterations to anticipate the
behavior of others, their expected responses, and others' expected re-
sponses to their expected responses.
Moreover, Katz's assumption that reputation is not a factor may
be a significant flaw in his predictions. To the extent that reputation is
a factor, it may prevent sellers from including the worst terms. Buy-
ers, realizing this, might anticipate terms roughly commensurate with
a seller's reputation. Thus, they might not read terms for manufactur-
ers that have excellent reputations because they would assume (a)
that the reputation was earned, i.e., that the terms in the past have
been good, and (b) that the manufacturer would not want to risk hurt-
ing that reputation, and so would not have replaced the terms with
bad ones. Buyers, however, might read some terms from unknown
sellers (particularly those from whom the buyers were considering
making repeat purchases), not being certain whether those sellers
were including high quality terms because they hoped to build a good
reputation or whether they were including bad terms, hoping to take
advantage of consumer ignorance.
Nonetheless, on the whole, Katz's model allows substantial in-
sight. He correctly notes that consumers must choose whether to in-
vest the cost into reading contractual terms before they know the
111. Landes and Posner have made this same argument: "[G]iven the high costs (rela-
tive to benefits) of information about an extremely low probability event, it may not pay
the consumer to study a disclaimer of liability .... " LANDES & POSNER, supra note 21, at
281; see also Eisenberg, supra note 43, at 243-44. Producers, of course, will anticipate these
buyers' incentives.
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content of those terms. Thus, their estimations of expected cost of the
terms must be made before reading them. Because they know that
many other buyers do not read the terms, they can expect that the
terms will be unfavorable. Therefore, they also can rationally not in-
vest the cost in reading the terms because they already know that they
are likely to be bad. Sellers can be expected to anticipate this and to
follow through with putting in bad terms, particularly those that con-
cern remote contingencies that are unlikely to affect their general rep-
utation because of the rarity of the contingency occurring. If sellers
determine that it would be more profitable to include better terms
(and charge a higher price), they can be expected to incur the expense
of informing the buyers of those terms (knowing that buyers will ra-
tionally expect bad terms unless they are informed otherwise). Of
course, buyers will anticipate this and, in the absence of express infor-
mation to the contrary (either in the form of an individualized offer or
more generally through advertising), will assume that the latent terms
are poor and will adjust the amount that they are willing to pay
accordingly.
2. Free Riders
A related problem is that, assuming an informed minority will
ensure that efficient terms are offered to all consumers, no individual
consumer has an incentive to be part of that informed minority. Be-
cause the cost of being informed is borne only by the minority and the
benefit is reaped equally by everyone, every consumer has a strong
incentive to free ride on the efforts of the others. 112
In essence, the terms demanded by an informed minority (call
them T* for convenience) are much like a public good. The two defin-
ing characteristics of a public good are that it is nonrival and that it is
nonexclusive. 1 3 A good is nonrival if the marginal cost of providing it
to another consumer is zero; it is nonexclusive if it is not possible to
keep additional people from using it or to charge them for doing so.
112. See TREBILCOCK & DEWEES, supra note 46, at 115 ("When one asks why [consum-
ers would not read even exceptionally clear contracts], many consumers probably rely in
part on the constraints (real or illusory) imposed by other consumers at the margin (i.e.,
they let the market shop for them."); Katz, supra note 49, at 280 ("Baird and Weisberg [in
arguing for the ability of an informed minority to demand efficient contracts for all] ignore
the incentive for recipients to free ride. Since reading and understanding forms is costly,
and since the benefits of efficient terms are enjoyed by the population as a whole, individ-
ual recipients might rationally sit back in the hope that others will keep the drafters
honest.").
113. See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 3, at 661-62.
[Vol. 47
NOT MY BROTHER'S KEEPER
T* is not nonrival, because the marginal cost to the seller of including
the terms for an additional buyer is positive." 4 But, by assumption," 5
T* is nonexclusive (because the seller cannot differentiate among
consumers).
Thus, T* is a rival, nonexclusive good, much like a public road
(without toll booths) or a crowded range of broadcast frequencies.
Each additional user exacts a cost, but the users nonetheless cannot be
prevented from using. Unfortunately, the problematic aspect of pub-
lic goods is their nonexclusivity, the feature T* shares with them. Be-
cause T* is nonexclusive, buyers cannot keep other buyers from
reaping the benefits of the terms, nor can they charge for them.
Thus, we are left with a situation where all buyers would prefer
that an informed minority existed (so that T* would be provided), but
none want to incur the cost of information necessary to be part of that
minority. If nobody else does it, then the cost of becoming informed
is simply a waste to the hapless buyer who does; and if enough other
buyers do it, then it is more profitable not to read and to free ride off
those who do." 6 And if everyone free rides, then there will be no one
to serve as an informed minority.
B. The Inability of Even a Large Informed Minority to Provide Efficient
Terms
1. The Marginal Consumer Is Not the Average Consumer
All that is necessary for an informed minority to dictate the inclu-
sion of certain terms in a standard form contract (under the theoreti-
cal assumptions) is for a sufficient number of consumers to be
114. It is important to keep in mind that the free riding occurs at the expense of the
informed buyers, not the sellers. In a sense, then, it is the information that is the public
good rather than the terms. But the information is not directly realized by the uniformed
buyers, the terms are. To use an analogy, imagine a lighthouse that gave off a very weak
radio signal that could only be heard if amplified by a special device on an incoming ship.
Yet once amplified, the signal stayed loud. One ship buys such an amplifier and follows the
signal to shore. Now that the signal is amplified, other ships likewise follow it to shore,
free riding on the first ship. Speaking precisely, it is not the amplifier that is being free
ridden upon, because the other ships never get the amplifier. Instead, they free ride on the
results of the amplifier, the loud signal. Just so, buyers do not free ride on the information
of informed buyers, because they never get the information, they just free ride on the
results of that information-the efficient terms. The distinction is not particularly impor-
tant, however, since the important result-true regardless of how you phrase it-is that
some consumers can reap the benefits of other consumers' efforts without paying the cost.
115. This assumption is crucial to the operation of an informed minority. See infra
Section II.A.2. Of course, the assumption is, in reality, highly dubious. See infra Section
IV.B.2.
116. See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 3, at 641, 665.
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marginal, i.e., for them to be willing to leave the market-not buy-if
they do not get their terms. If the cost to sellers of losing those buyers
is greater than the cost of including the desired terms, the theory
predicts that the sellers will include them. Frequently, this minority of
marginal consumers is described as "informed," meaning that it has
studied (or will study) the contractual terms offered and demands the
terms most in line with its preferences. But it need not be informed.
Indeed, any sufficient group of marginal consumers can demand a
change in the product, and, if the conditions hold, its desires will be
met. The only thing we can know about the demands of groups of
marginal consumers is that they will demand according to their
preferences.
But there is no reason to assume that marginal consumers are
average consumers. Michael Spence has explained this problem as
follows:
[Efficient, i.e., social welfare maximizing, terms will be provided]
only if the marginal consumer is average or representative.... [B]ut
there is nothing at all intrinsic to the market that guarantees that
the marginal purchaser is representative. On the contrary, in many
cases, the marginal consumer is quite unlikely to be representative
in his marginal valuation of quality. 117
The very fact that they are marginal may be enough for us to
expect that marginal consumers are not typical.'" 8 Croley and Hanson
make this point as follows:
Implicit in [the theory of the informed minority] is the assumption
that marginal consumers represent a random sample of the entire
pool of a product's consumers. Otherwise, by satisfying the prefer-
ence of marginal consumers, manufacturers would ... fail to satisfy
the preference of the average consumer. Also implicit, however, is
the assumption that most marginal consumers, unlike inframarginal
consumers, base their consumption choices on the content of war-
ranties. Unfortunately, the [informed minority] theory fails to rec-
oncile the positions that marginal consumers are similar to
inframarginal consumers in their demand for warranty coverage but
different from inframarginal consumers in their willingness to ac-
quire information regarding warranty content."19
117. A. Michael Spence, Monopoly, Quality, and Regulation, 6 BELL J. ECON. 417, 418
(1975); see also TREBILCOCK & DEWEES, supra note 46, at 108; Richard Craswell, Passing
on the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and Distribution in Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43
STAN. L. REV. 361, 373-76 (1991).
118. That they invested the cost in becoming informed may at least suggest that margi-
nal consumers are more risk averse than the average consumer. See Walrod, supra note 47,
at 36.
119. Croley & Hanson, supra note 18, at 783-84.
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Indeed, Croley and Hanson argue that the fact that marginal con-
sumers are willing to leave the market if warranty terms are unsatis-
factory to them may be a result of their having a lower demand for
warranty terms than do average consumers. 120 This claim-that mar-
ginal consumers have a lower demand for warranty coverage than av-
erage consumersl 2 -is the basis of Croley and Hanson's proffered
"new exploitation theory."'2
Regardless of whether the marginal consumers are demanding
better or worse terms than would the average consumer, there is no
reason to suppose that they are demanding the same. All that we can
know is that they are particularly sensitive to some aspect of the con-
tract-not that the average consumer (or even just one other con-
sumer outside the marginal minority) necessarily shares their
preferences. Thus, we cannot expect an informed minority-no mat-
ter how large-to demand efficient terms for all consumers. Instead,
we must just expect them to demand their particular preferences, re-
gardless of overall efficiency.
This problem becomes particularly salient if the market condi-
tions are such that the informed minority can be relatively small.' 23 If
the informed minority is only five percent or two percent of the mar-
ket, then the likelihood of its preferences being typical decreases sub-
stantially. At that small a size, there is a far greater chance that the
preferences of the minority are not average, and that they will skew
the sellers' output accordingly. This problem is lessened if the minor-
ity necessary to demand terms is larger, say 30%, but then, of course,
the odds of such a large minority existing are correspondingly small.
The important point is that there is no reason to expect an in-
formed minority to typify the demands of the other consumers. The
sole unifying factor of the minority is that a sufficient number of them
are willing not to buy a product if it does not conform to their wishes.
120. At first glance, this may seem to invert the informed minority argument. Rhetori-
cally, it is often stated that the informed minority "protects" the buyers that do not read, so
one might expect that the informed minority would be demanding greater warranty cover-
age or more favorable contractual terms, not less coverage and less favorable terms. Yet
recall that the argument is usually advanced by proponents of the market and opponents of
judicial intervention into contracting. Courts do not generally intervene into contracts that
provide buyers too much protection; rather, they do the reverse. Therefore, the informed
minority argument is usually marshaled to rebut the claim that consumers cannot have
consented to limited warranty coverage or unfavorable terms because they did not read the
terms.
121. But see note 118, supra.
122. See Croley & Hanson, supra note 18, at 784.
123. See supra Section III.A.2.
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Those wishes could be for a different warranty, for a different forum
selection clause, or even for the product to be colored avocado green.
If differentiation is not possible, then that minority will get its way-
and everyone will suffer the products dictated by the minority's pref-
erences. Thus, there is no reason to assert that the results conform to
the overall preferences of the market-are efficient-just because the
minority demands them.
2. Sellers Can and Do Differentiate Among Buyers
A fundamental assumption of the informed minority argument is
that sellers cannot differentiate among buyers. But, at the trumpet of
differentiation, the walls of the argument crumble. And that trumpet
is playing a more realistic tune than the alternative assumption that
sellers cannot and do not differentiate.
In the real world, sellers regularly differentiate both ex ante and
ex post. Ex ante, sellers differentiate continually both on product and
on price. We do not live in a world of widgets, and once we relax the
assumption of product homogeneity, the model faces even more
problems. In fact, we live in a world of great product diversity. One
can walk into any department store and see hundreds of television
sets, all different sizes and all different prices. Even within the same
size, one can find twenty-seven inch sets for $400 and for $1400. With
heterogeneous products, each consumer must look through the many
choices and find the one most suited to his needs.124 Therefore, pro-
ducers can allow buyers to self-differentiate. They can offer some
products with efficient terms and some without. Informed consumers,
in the process of selecting their goods from the diverse marketplace of
products (from each seller) can select those goods that have the terms
that they want. The remaining uninformed consumers will be left to
purchase products regardless of their unknown terms.
Heterogeneous products may also aid differentiation if consumer
preferences follow predictable patterns. For a good assumed to be
homogenous, all buyers are clumped together, and differentiation is
difficult. But, for example, "cars" are not homogenous. Hyundais are
very different from Cadillacs; and their buyers likely are as well. As
Richard Craswell has observed, "[i]t therefore would not be surprising
124. This heterogeneity of products also increases the likelihood that a large informed
minority will not exist. If consumers must sift through not only price but also countless
other features that differentiate products, then the cost of searching for products increases.
Assuming decreasing marginal utility of searching, the more consumers spend searching
for products, the less likely they are to spend even more learning about latent terms.
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for the consumers of any particular brand and model to have roughly
similar preferences concerning the value of a warranty or any other
legal right."'1 25 If that were so, then producers could sell some goods
that consumers inclined to be informed preferred-with the terms
that they prefer-and sell other goods to the remaining consumers
without those terms.126
Sellers can also differentiate directly, through sales conversations
with prospective buyers. 127 Or they can do so by proxy. Salesmen
can look for features characteristic of poorly informed buyers, like be-
ing a tourist or new in town. Similarly, salesmen can begin by offering
buyers a relatively poor offer-which the uninformed buyers may ac-
cept-and can be ready to dicker down to a more reasonable offer if
an informed buyer counter-offers. Hence the haggling at many a local
market.128
Moreover, for many products there is clear differentiating on con-
tractual terms. When renting a car, the agent will ask the consumer if
he would like optional insurance. The informed consumer declines;
the sucker subsidizes Avis. When selling a car, the salesman parades
useless options before the buyer (like the ubiquitous "rust-proofing").
The informed consumer declines; the chump has a rust-free car like
the rest of us. When dealing blackjack, the dealer offers insurance
when the card count favors the player. The informed player declines;
the patsy flees the terrible ace and finances Donald Trump. When
selling appliances, the manufacturer offers a "guaranteed lowest
price." The informed price consumer brings in a competitor's offer
125. Craswell, supra note 117, at 373.
126. It seems plausible, for example, that attorneys-facing lower information costs for
interpreting contractual legalese-are more likely to be informed than non-attorneys.
Since many attorneys tend to prefer higher priced automobiles, one might expect sellers of
automobiles to offer better contractual terms for higher priced cars. Similarly, business-
men and others who deal regularly with the legal system or who may be more likely to
have friends or relatives that are attorneys (who might tell them of particularly onerous or
advantageous clauses) would also likely have similar demand characteristics and so could
increase the probability that sellers could effectively differentiate informed consumers and
segregate them in particular product markets.
127. Indeed, this differentiating is facilitated with heterogeneous goods because they
more frequently require sales personnel assistance, have no fixed price, and allow for ex-
press negotiation. See TREBILCOCK & DEWEES, supra note 46, at 111. But see Eisenberg,
supra note 42, at 242 ("[M]ost form contracts are tendered by agents who have no author-
ity to vary the preprinted terms, so that deliberating on those terms will often be point-
less."). Of course, many of those agents to whom Eisenberg refers will have managers or
supervisors who will have authority to vary terms, so the informed consumers simply have
to be determined to see somebody with authority to satisfy them.
128. See TREBILCOCK & DEWEES, supra note 46, at 110-11.
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and gets a lower price, the lazy buyer pays the higher amount. Per-
haps the most commonplace-and effective-means of ex ante differ-
entiation are those little warranty cards that come with most
household products. The informed consumer sends them in within
thirty days; the rest of us toss them with the daily garbage.
Cases abound where parties-informed consumers-have simply
changed standard form contracts to suit their preferences. In Interna-
tional Milling Co. v. Hachmeister, Inc.,129 for example, the buyer re-
ceived from the seller a signed letter giving broader warranty
coverage than did the standard form contract that the buyer had none-
theless signed. Likewise, in Harlow & Jones, Inc. v. Advance Steel
Co., 130 the buyer circled the clauses in the standard form contract that
he did not want and the seller simply waived them. And in Construc-
tion Aggregates Corp. v. Hewitt-Robins, Inc.,131 the buyer extracted a
"substitute warranty clause" to replace the clause in the standard form
contract. Sellers, when faced with informed consumers, can simply
change their terms to accommodate those consumers, while keeping
the terms in for those unaware.
Sellers also differentiate ex post. A contract may contain limited
consumer protection, yet the consumer who complains and argues
gets his way. A baby stroller may be not covered by warranty, yet the
manufacturer may decide to replace its broken wheel when its owner
complains loudly (the squeaky wheel ... ). This ex post differentia-
tion allows producers to include, for example, unfavorable latent war-
ranty terms at the time of purchase. When the product breaks, the
benefits of reading the terms increase substantially, and so most buy-
ers likely go back and read their warranty. Most, upon finding that
they are not covered, will lament their bad luck and foolishness for
not checking earlier. Some, however, will no doubt complain. Since it
is the complainers who are most likely to create bad will for sellers,
the seller can just choose to replace or repair the product for the com-
plainers.132 Thus, those that really value the warranty protection (or,
129. 380 Pa. 407 (1955). We are grateful to Slawson, supra note 20, at 43-44, for discov-
ering and collecting these cases.
130. 424 F. Supp. 770, 773 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
131. 404 F.2d 505, 508 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 921 (1969).
132. See Katz, supra note 49, at 281 ("Having the terms [unfavorable to the consumer]
in the writing gives a seller the discretion to invest in goodwill in circumstances where it is
most valuable to do so, while leaving him the option of enforcing the contract to the letter
at other times .... [T]he goodwill that comes from waiver ex post may be a more valuable
kind, because insisting on less than one's demonstrable legal rights has particular sali-
ence."); Walrod, supra note 47, at 35 ("By changing terms only for those buyers who com-
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at least, those that are willing to make their displeasure known persist-
ently133) can receive it, while the manufacturer nonetheless can differ-
entiate them from the uninformed masses who simply bear the loss.
Conclusion
The foregoing analysis has demonstrated the complexity of re-
laxing the assumption of perfect information for contract formation
and tort liability disclaimers. Ultimately, both sides seem to be miss-
ing the mark. It is not true that one should always expect efficient
terms or that one should never expect them. Instead, one must ana-
lyze the particular characteristics of the market and the term in ques-
tion. As our formal model has shown, it may be possible for an
informed minority of as little as 1% to cure imperfections in form con-
tracts or it may be necessary that 90% of consumers be informed
before a particular efficient term will be expected. In particular, two
factors have great significance: the cost savings to the producer of the
inefficient terms and the amount of profit that the producer makes on
informed consumers given an efficient set of terms. The greater the
cost savings to the manufacturer of including the inefficient term, the
greater the percentage of consumers that must be informed to prevent
the occurrence of the term. And, the greater the profit to the manu-
facturer given an efficient set of terms, the smaller the percentage of
consumers that must be informed to prevent the manufacturer from
including inefficient terms.
Once the number of informed consumers necessary to ensure an
efficient term equilibrium is established, however, one must still deter-
mine whether that many consumers are likely to be informed and, if
they are, whether differentiation is present. The preceding analysis
has shown several reasons why it is very unlikely that a significant
number of consumers will ever be informed and why, even if the req-
uisite number of informed consumers were present, one should never-
theless be wary of concluding that an efficient term equilibrium will
occur. First, particularly in the absence of express disclaimers, it is
plain, the seller could partially discriminate among the informed and uninformed
buyers.").
133. It is possible that different treatment ex post is not a result of differentiation seg-
regating informed from uninformed buyers and attempting to saddle the latter with the
costs of inefficient terms. It could be that complainers create a consumer externality, such
that the seller may attempt to buy off their silence rather than risk losing widespread con-
sumer goodwill. Thus, consumers that complain may find their demands met even though
they are not typical of consumers and even though those demands-if provided univer-
sally-would not be efficient. See TREBILCOCK & DEWEES, supra note 46, at 109.
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seldom the case that there will be many consumers for whom the cost
of becoming informed is less than the expected loss from the ineffi-
cient terms. Second, game theory suggests that the dominant strategy
for consumers will be to remain uninformed, because they must
choose whether to invest in information before they know the value of
that information. Third, there is a very strong incentive for buyers to
free ride on the information of others, and if everybody free rides, no
informed minority will ever form.
Even if a sufficiently large informed minority did form (a doubt-
ful proposition), that still would not guarantee efficient terms. First,
there is no guarantee-indeed it seems unlikely-that the marginal
consumer will be typical of other consumers. Therefore, the prefer-
ences of the marginal consumers should not be presumed to be effi-
cient for the market as a whole. Second, it will often be easy for the
manufacturer to employ product and price differentiation. This can
occur both ex ante and ex post, even in the absence of a sales force or
high-cost, individual negotiations.
In short, the informed minority argument, while theoretically
plausible, faces substantial limitations. These limitations, when
viewed together, largely vitiate any force the argument might have.
Imperfect information is a common problem that should be consid-
ered and compensated for somehow. While the current legal re-
sponses in contract and tort law may not be the best responses, neither
are the actions of informed minorities. The necessary assumptions
just do not hold.
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